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The internet has facilitated the creation of new markets characterized by large scale, increased customization,
rapid innovation and the collection and use of detailed consumer and market data. I describe these
changes and some of the economic theory that has been useful for thinking about online advertising
markets, retail and business-to-business e-commerce, internet job matching and financial exchanges,
and other internet platforms. I also discuss the empirical evidence on competition and consumer behavior










  The last fifteen years has seen the striking emergence of new internet platforms for 
search, e-commerce, online media, job matching, financial trading, social networking and other 
activities. The growth of these platforms has been dramatic. Amazon opened in 1995 and today 
has annual revenue of over thirty billion dollars. Google, which started in 1998, now processes 
over a billion search queries each day. China's Taobao has added three hundred and fifty million 
users since it began in 2003. Facebook, founded in 2004, has added over five hundred million 
users. In just the last two years, the discount platform Groupon grew from nothing to a reported 
annual revenue of almost two billion dollars.
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  These and other internet platforms all take advantage of how the internet has lowered a 
range of economic costs: the cost of creating and distributing certain types of products and 
services, the cost of acquiring information about these goods, the cost of collecting and using 
data on consumer preferences and behavior. These changes have helped make internet platforms 
particularly dynamic and innovative, and inspired a great deal of economic research.   
  Before turning to this research, it is useful to highlight several aspects of internet 
platforms that strike me as particularly distinctive relative to traditional industries. One that is 
already suggested by the numbers above is scale, or scalability. Internet firms often have very 
low costs of serving additional users because the underlying code and engineering is scalable. 
Facebook, for example, grew to over 500 million users with less than 500 engineers, or one 
engineer for every million users.
2 The ability to expand rapidly at low cost is particularly relevant 
                                                 
1 The Amazon, Taobao and Facebook numbers are from company annual reports. The Groupon estimate is from the 
Wall Street Journal's All Things Digital blog, "Groupon Annual Revenues Actually $2 Billion" post dated December 
3, 2010. Ellison and Ellison (2005) point out that Amazon took just five years to reach a billion dollars in sales, 
while Walmart took nineteen. 
2 "Scaling Facebook to 500 Million Users and Beyond," blog post by Robert Johnson (July 21, 2010) at 
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=409881258919. As another example, the social media platform Twitter 
has grown to over 200 million users with just 350 employees (http://blog.twitter.com/2010/12/stocking-stuffer.html).  
2 
in thinking about the market structure of internet industries, and about how platforms can design 
market mechanisms that operate efficiently and take advantage of large scale. 
  A second distinctive feature of internet markets is customization. In traditional markets, it 
tends to be costly to personalize individual experiences. In online markets, it is common to have 
products recommended on the basis of past purchases, to obtain search results tailored to 
individual queries, or to see advertisements that reflect past browsing behavior.
3 This type of 
customization in principle can facilitate a more efficient matching of people and opportunities. 
The platforms mentioned above all have been highly successful in introducing market 
institutions that exploit this --- creating real-time markets for advertising placements, 
recommender systems that aggregate user feedback, or allowing for third-party applications that 
leverage their data about individual user preferences or social contacts.   
  Finally, a third characteristic of internet platforms is that they’re associated with rapid 
innovation. By innovation, I have in mind the creation of new products and ideas, and perhaps 
even more importantly, the gradual and continuous refinement of things like search algorithms, 
information displayed to users, product characteristics, and payment and pricing mechanisms. 
The opportunity to make continuous improvements is particularly relevant because internet 
platforms can adjust a variety of parameters relatively easily. In fact, a striking feature of many 
internet platforms is their use of controlled experiments to guide this process. Economists are 
often frustrated by how little systematic experimentation occurs in traditional markets. But 
experiments can be costly and results obtained too slowly to generate substantial benefits. The 
calculus changes when a few lines of code result in different users seeing different displays or 
facing different prices, and the results are measured instantaneously. 
                                                 
3 Heski Bar-Isaac pointed out to me that another form of customization in internet markets, for instance on platforms 
such as Wikipedia or Yelp, is that users can provide customized input into the product. I will not have much to say 
about this type of "user-generated content" in this paper.  
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  With these features as background, my goal in this paper is to describe an expanding but 
somewhat disparate body of economic research inspired by the growth of new internet platforms. 
Because this area is still relatively new, I focus on three strands where there have been 
interesting theoretical or empirical advances. The first is research in industrial organization on 
how platforms compete for users. The main emphasis in this work is on the role of network 
effects, and their implications for platform strategy and the dynamics of market structure. I 
describe the modeling framework and the insights it generates for internet platforms in Section 2. 
  In Section 3, I discuss a second line of research on the innovative market mechanisms 
created by many internet platforms. These mechanisms include new types of auctions for 
advertising, financial products and other goods, novel reputation and recommender systems 
based on user data and feedback, and structured search processes for retail shopping, job 
matching and other goods and services. A main theme here is how technology allows for new 
ways of designing market mechanisms that take advantage of the scale and heterogeneity of 
many internet markets. 
  In Section 4, I turn from what are mostly theoretical models to discuss empirical research 
on competition and consumer behavior in online markets. A major focus of this work is how 
different types of falling costs --- of consumer search, of product proliferation, of using dynamic 
pricing mechanisms, and so forth --- have affected different markets and industries. I also give 
some examples of how researchers have used the relatively structured environment of internet 
markets to test theories about consumer decision-making or imperfect competition. 
  The final section concludes with some speculation about promising directions for future 
research. Because the area of research I discuss is relatively young, there are still many open 
questions, and opportunities for advances in both theory and empirical methods.   
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2. Platform Strategy and Competition 
  Over the last decade, the theory of platform competition has been one of the most active 
areas of research in industrial organization (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 
2006; Armstrong, 2006; Rysman, 2009; Weyl, 2010). Although this work is not internet-specific 
--- its motivating examples include operating systems, payment cards, shopping malls, 
magazines and a host of other industries --- it is a good point of entry for thinking about the 
strategic problems facing internet platforms and how they compete for users. 
  The main idea in this work is to think of platforms as intermediaries that bring together 
different types of users to enable economic or social interaction. In the case of e-commerce or 
online apartment rentals, the groups might be buyers and sellers. In online media, the groups 
might include consumers, producers of content, and advertisers. What is emphasized is that 
assembling users --- buyers and sellers, consumers and advertisers, groups of friends --- involves 
network effects. The value users assign to the platform can depend on who else is using it.  
The recent modeling efforts build on an older literature in industrial organization 
pioneered by Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Farrell and Saloner (1985). A new step is to explore 
the strategic and competitive implications of network effects when platforms assemble different 
types of users, and there are externalities across user groups. 
 
A. The Price Theory of Platforms 
  The role of network effects are fairly easy to capture using standard price theory (Rochet 
and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Armstrong, 2006). Here I follow the treatment in Weyl (2010).  
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  Think about a platform that sets prices for K different user groups, with individual users 
then deciding whether to participate. Suppose that the willingness to pay of an individual in 
group k is uk(x,ζ), where xk denotes the number of group k users who participate, x=(x1,...xK) 
denotes the vector of participant quantities, and ζ are the individual's characteristics. The payoff 
from not participating is zero. So if the platform charges a fee pk to group k users, the individual 
will participate if and only if uk(x,ζ )≥ pk . The platform also incurs costs from serving its users: if 
participation is x, the platform's costs are C(x). 
  There is an important aspect of coordination in this model because each individual’s 
decision to participate can depends on the decisions of others. If the platform sets fixed prices for 
each user group, p=(p1,...,pK), there can be multiple levels of equilibrium participation. This 
indeterminacy seems to pose a modeling challenge. Suppose, however, there is some 
heterogeneity among consumers, so that if individuals in group k expect overall participation x, 
their willingness to pay to use the platform is continuously distributed. Then for any participation 
level x that could result as a participation equilibrium, the fee the platform can extract from each 
user group is uniquely pinned down --- for group k, it corresponds to the utility of the xkth most 
enthusiastic user taking overall participation x as fixed. Because of this, it is convenient to think 
of the platform's problem as one of choosing quantities rather than prices (Weyl, 2010).
4  
  To follow this route, let Pk(xk;x) denote the price that exactly xk users from group k would 
be willing to pay, assuming they expect an overall number of users x. That is, fixing expectations 
that participation will be x, Pk(·;x) is the inverse demand curve for group k. Naturally Pk(xk;x) 
will be decreasing in xk, but it may be increasing or decreasing in x depending on the sign of the 
                                                 
4 In effect, this means making the implicit assumption that the platform will be able to obtain its preferred 
participation outcome, should the there be multiple participation equilibria corresponding to the prices it sets. One 
justification is that if the platform can make the prices contingent on realized participation, it can make x a unique 
participation equilibrium. One way to do this, if the platform wishes to implement x=(x1,...,xK) , is to charge group k 
users Pk(xk,x*), where x* is the realized participation (Weyl, 2010, and Weyl and White, 2010).   
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network effects. If there are two user groups, buyers and sellers, we would expect positive cross-
group externalities, so ∂Pk(x)/∂xj > 0 if k≠j, but negative within-group externalities because 
sellers compete with other sellers and buyers with other buyers. 
  The profit maximizing participation solves 
( ) ( ) x C x x P x
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  The first order conditions for this problem equate the marginal revenue for each user 
group k with the marginal cost MCk(x)=∂C(x)/∂xk. There is a convenient way to express these 
conditions that distinguishes the usual trade-off in maximizing profit against a downward-
sloping demand curve from considerations involving network effects. Holding expected 
participation fixed at x ˆ , the marginal revenue for group k is 
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  This approach captures some intuitive ideas about platform strategy and competition. For 
instance, it immediately leads to the conclusion that platforms should engage in cross-
subsidization: charging low prices user groups that create value for others and higher prices  who 
do not. So search engines offer free email and other services to users in the hope of making more 
money from advertisers. Electronic financial exchanges charge low fees, or even payments, to 
traders who submit limit orders that create liquidity in the order book; they charge higher fees to 
traders who submit crossing orders that remove liquidity. 
  The approach also points to a tension between extracting surplus from core users, and 
lowering prices to expand the user base. The tension is most interesting in a dynamic context,  
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where existing users may be “locked in”. Then a platform may be tempted to raises fees on these 
users at the cost of slowing platform growth. Although this is a standard in switching cost 
models, an added element here is that by reducing the user base the platform in effect may be 
degrading its quality for the existing users (a “two-sided” analogue might be an email service or 
website that expands the number of intrusive video ads). 
  The model also highlights two familiar distortions from profit-maximization (Weyl, 
2010). Apart from focusing on the marginal revenue from additional users rather than their 
marginal surplus, there is a "Spence distortion": the platform cares about the externality new 
users impose on marginal rather than average participants. To see this, one can compare the 
profit-maximizing solution to the conditions for an efficient allocation, 
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which say that group k users should be charged their marginal cost minus the externality they 
impose on others (which could be positive or negative).
5  
  Note that one of the features of this model is that all of the details of what the platform 
does, and how users interact, are incorporated in the payoff functions uk and the cost function C. 
Platform fees have no direct effect on user interactions. For instance, if there are distinct groups 
of buyers and sellers, imposing a fee on sellers only affects buyers if it causes some sellers to 
exit the market. So we are abstracting from issues of market organization and efficiency that will 
come up in the next section, and focusing squarely on network effects in user participation. 
  Partly as a result, the model does not provide much insight into the structure of platform 
fees. In e-commerce, for example, platforms such as the business-to-business procurement 
                                                 
5 The importance of the "Spence distortion" in this model raises the question of whether internet platforms really do 
focus too much attention on marginal users. A priori, one suspects the effect might be countered or even outweighed 
by the ability of dedicated users to exert influence in ways that do not involve threatening to exit.  
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platform Alibaba charge sellers a flat annual fee for listing their products. Other platforms such 
as eBay Motors charge a fee for each individual listing. Still others charge sellers for clicks 
(common on price comparison sites), or a commission on sales (Amazon, Etsy and others). 
These fee structures have very different implications for seller incentives, for the quality of 
listings and potentially for platform revenue, but call for a model in which users make decisions 
about the nature and intensity of their activity rather than a binary participation decision.
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B. Platform Competition and Market Structure 
  The network effects model is particularly useful for thinking about competition between 
platforms. Here a central question is whether certain types of activity will become concentrated 
on a single platform – whether a platform industry will “tip”. Internet search and consumer 
auctions are two common examples of industries that tipped in the early days of the internet. In 
the U.S., Google emerged from a host of competing search engines to capture around two-thirds 
of the market. And eBay quickly captured the consumer auction market despite the presence of 
many competing platforms. These markets also have dominant firms in China in the form of 
Baidu and Taobao, and in many other countries. 
  A standard concern is that if a platform becomes dominant, there may be dynamic 
inefficiencies because users are coordinated and locked-in to a single platform. It may be 
difficult for an innovative new platform to gain market share, even if its underlying attributes and 
technology are better. This concern has helped to motivate antitrust actions in industries such as 
operating systems and payment cards. It therefore raises the question of whether internet 
                                                 
6 A related point is that model I’ve described imposes the assumption that every member of group j matters the same 
to group k users. On a job search website, for instance, it is inevitable that some job seekers will be more attractive 
to employers. To the extent that having “attractive” applicants is important to employers, platform pricing per se 
may be less important than explicit screening decisions by the platform or having a search or application process 
that lets firms identify high-quality matches. Similar sorting considerations can apply in other contexts as well.  
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platforms should be viewed as similar or in some way different, and whether analogous 
competitive or antitrust concerns might arise. 
  Models of the type considered above suggest a number of factors to look at: the degree to 
which consumers view competing platforms as substitutable, the strength of positive network 
effects, and the extent to which production is characterized by economies of scale (e.g. Farrell 
and Klemperer, 2007). The importance of these factors can vary. For instance, the value offered 
by social networks depends heavily on the number and identity of other users, and employers are 
likely to favor job matching sites that can offer them a large number of qualified applicants, but 
it is less obvious why consumers would favor a search engine solely because it has larger market 
share. On the other hand, a search engine operating a larger scale may have better data to 
improve its algorithms, and hence may enjoy certain types of scale economy. 
  In traditional industries with network effects, high switching costs are often an important 
compounding factor. Consider the case of operating systems, where switching costs can be 
relatively high for individual users and for firms with large computer installations. Switching 
between internet platforms or using multiple platforms can be considerably easier. That is, one 
can shop on Amazon and eBay, or be a Facebook user and try Twitter. At least in some cases, the 
combination of low switching costs and low costs to creating new platforms might mitigate 
traditional concerns about lock-in and dynamic inefficiency.
7  
  A striking example where internet technology lowered entry barriers and undermined a 
dominant platform is in the market for publicly traded equities in the United States. As recently 
as 2005, around eighty percent of trades in New York Stock Exchange listed equities took place 
on the exchange floor. The next several years saw the rapid entry of new electronic exchanges, 
                                                 
7 Indeed, even in industries such as social networking, where one might expect positive feedback effects to generate 
agglomeration, it is easy to point to examples of successful entry (Twitter) or rapid decline (MySpace).  
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including the introduction of an electronic trading platform by the NYSE itself. By 2009, trading 
had fragmented to the point where the combined share of the NYSE floor and electronic 
exchange we 25%, and no single marketplace executed more than 20% of the overall public 
equities trades.
8 Of course, the fragmentation may be a temporary dislocation, so it will be 
interesting to see if trading eventually reverts to being highly concentrated. 
 
C. Empirical Evidence on Platforms and Platform Competition   
  One limitation of the platform competition model I have described --- for analyzing 
pricing and especially for questions about competition and market tipping --- is that its predictive 
content depends largely on empirical quantities. In contrast to say, retail products, where there is 
a fair amount of evidence on demand elasticities or brand preferences, there is not much 
systematic evidence on preferences for single-homing, or the size and strength of network 
effects, or even price elasticities, all of which are key parameters in network effects models of 
platform competition (Rysman, 2009). 
  In a way this is a little surprising because the internet offers many opportunities for 
simple and clean empirical studies. A good illustration is Brown and Morgan (2009), who look at 
competition between eBay and Yahoo! auctions. For their study, they auctioned identical coins 
on the two platforms. They conducted they auctions in 2004, at which time eBay had about 80% 
of the consumer auction market. The results of the auctions were striking: their eBay sales 
attracted 50% more bidders and the resulting eBay prices were a third higher. Their conclusion 
was that the market was in the process of tipping all the way toward eBay.  
                                                 
8 Remarkably over this same 2005 to 2009 period, the number of executed trades on US exchanges increased more 
than eight fold, the average order size fell by 60%, and the average speed of execution fell from ten seconds to less 
than one second. (SEC, Concept Release on Market Structure, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2010/34-61358.pdf).  
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Several features of their study are striking. One is that the evidence leads to new 
questions: Why didn't buyers arbitrage the price differences? Did eBay subsequently exploit its 
market power and charge sellers higher fees? Why were some sellers still using Yahoo! given the 
large price differentials? Another is how easy the study was to run -- it essentially amounted to 
running a few dozen auctions on two internet sites.
9 It shows how internet markets lower some of 
the typical barriers to collecting data. In light of the effort devoted to advancing the theory, and 
its dependence on empirical quantities, one hopes for more empirical evidence in the future.  
 
3. Designing Novel Market Institutions  
  The models of platform competition discussed above take a relatively high-level view, 
focusing on platform pricing and user decisions to join a platform, but not addressing how 
platforms try to structure economic or social activity in ways that create value. As economic 
activity has shifted online, however, there also has been a burst of innovative market 
mechanisms and institutions. Examples include large-scale consumer marketplaces for used 
goods, services, and loans; real-time markets for advertising and financial trading; online 
"superstores" for books, retail and media, and many more. In many of these cases, internet 
platforms have used novel mechanisms particularly engineered to take advantage of the scale, 
scope and continuous nature of activity permitted by new technology.  
In this section, I illustrate these points by discussing two examples of innovations in 
market design: auctions for “sponsored search” advertising placements, and reputations systems 
to ensure safe trade in e-commerce marketplaces. Each of these examples has attracted a good 
                                                 
9 Of course, the overall research process in economics isn't nearly as frictionless as collecting the data. You'll note 
that the Brown and Morgan study wasn't published until 2009, five years after their experiments were conducted.  
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deal of research attention. At the end of the section, I describe a few related settings that have 
been studied less, but raise similarly interesting questions about internet market design. 
 
A. Sponsored Search Advertising 
  The basic problem in internet search is to match user requests for information with 
relevant search results. A good solution to this problem must be scalable --- Google, for instance, 
gets hundreds of billions of queries a year, and tens or hundreds of millions of distinct queries on 
any given day. Search engines use two different methods to provide search results. They display 
"organic" results based on data gleaned from internet pages and user behavior, and "sponsored" 
results that are allocated using a market-based approach.  
  The market for sponsored search results operates in real time. When a user enters a query, 
the search engine runs an auction to allocate space on the results page to advertisers that have 
placed bids for the relevant search terms. One rationale for using an auction is that it elicits 
information from advertisers about their value for having their advertisement shown. It also 
determines the price the search engine can charge for selling the space on the results page. 
Because the value of having an ad appear after any single query is relatively small, the revenue 
from any single auction is on the order of a few pennies. But the number of queries is so large 
that the annual revenue of search engines is already in the tens of billions of dollars.  
  What I want to describe in this section is how this type of auction market can be modeled 
and analyzed, how the auction markets run by Google and the other search engines evolved to 
their present form, and why they might be a fairly efficient solution to the matching problem in 
internet search settings.  
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  Two papers by Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2007) and Varian (2007) have 
proposed a very elegant formulation of the problem. There are M positions. The top position will 
receive the most user attention and clicks, then the next position, and so forth. There are also N 
advertisers, with different values from having their ads clicked on. Specifically, assume that 
position m will receive xm clicks, where x1 > ... > xM, and that advertiser n has a per-click value 
vn, where v1 ≥ ... ≥ vN. If advertiser n buys position m, its payoff is vnxm - t, its value per click 
multiplied by the number of clicks it receives minus the payment t it makes to the platform. 
  This setting is a special case of the classical assignment model (Shapley and Shubik, 
1972). The efficient assignment is assortative. The high-value advertiser should get the top 
position and the most clicks, the second-highest value advertiser the next position, and so on. In 
addition, the efficient assignment also can be supported with competitive market-clearing prices. 
Suppose we set prices t1,...,tM for the M positions. These prices will clear the market (and support 
an efficient allocation) if and only if for each advertiser n, and each k≠ m,  
k k n m m n t x v t x v − ≥ −  
  This condition says that advertiser n prefers to buy position n at a price of tn than to buy 
any other position m≠n.
10  In fact, only a few of these conditions are relevant because if 
advertiser n prefers position n to positions n-1 and n+1, it will also prefer n to the other positions.  
Because of the discrete nature of the goods, there typically are a range of market-clearing 
prices. However, there is always a single competitive price vector that is (component-wise) 
maximal, and also one that is minimal. At the minimal market clearing prices, each advertiser is 
just indifferent between his own position and the position below him, and 
                                                 
10 I am being a bit casual about the possibility that some positions are left unfilled or advertisers left unmatched --- 
i.e. about the case where N≠M. To nail things down, we can assume that N>M (without loss of generality in that we 
always can “create” some advertisers with zero value), and as a notational convention set xm = tm = 0 for m>M.  
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( ) ∑ + ≥ − − =
1 n k k k k n x x v     t 1  
The minimum market clearing prices, and any set of competitive prices, are increasing on 
per-click basis as one moves from lower to higher positions.
11 The reason is that advertiser n 
must be willing to pay for the extra xn - xn-1 clicks obtained in position n relative to position n+1, 
but not for the extra clicks obtained in position n-1. So the incremental cost of clicks must be 
increasing as one moves to higher positions.  
  To generate prices in practice, the leading search engines use a "generalized second 
price" (GSP) auction. Each advertiser submits a maximum amount it would be willing to pay for 
a user to click on its ad, the positions are assigned in order of the bids, and advertisers pay the 
minimum necessary to sustain their position - in the simplest case, the next highest bid. In 
practice, each advertiser only pays if the user clicks on its ad, in which case it pays the "per 
click" bid of the next highest advertiser.  
  The GSP auction is interesting because it involves a series of innovations that came about 
partly for practical reasons, but that turn out to have attractive theoretical properties.  
  A first innovation is that advertising is priced on a "per click" basis. In traditional media, 
advertising is often sold by the “eyeball” or per impression. Pricing clicks takes advantage of the 
fact that on the internet, it is easier to measure and track a user's response to advertising. But why 
is per-click pricing useful? One reason is that positions on a web page are worth different 
amounts depending on their prominence. So asking advertisers to bid for positions on the page 
would make for a complicated auction. Provided that clicks have roughly the same value 
regardless of the position from which the click was received, an auction with "per click" bidding 
                                                 
11 For instance, suppose there are two positions that receive 200 and 100 clicks, and three advertisers with per-click 
values 3,2, and 1. The price of the lower position must be at least 100 to deter the lowest value bidder, but no more 
than 200. Similarly, the incremental price of the top position must be between 200 and 300 to ensure the market 
clears. So the lowest equilibrium prices are (300, 100) and the highest are (500, 200), and the respective "per click" 
prices are (3/2,1) and (5/2,2).  
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simplifies the market. It reduces the dimension of each advertiser's bid from the number of 
positions to a single number.
12 
  The second price format is another innovation. The initial search advertising auctions 
called for bidders to pay their own bid rather than the bid of the next ranked bidder. 
Unfortunately, if bidders have complete information about each other’s values, a pay-your-bid 
auction for positions has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Each bidder would like to 
reduce its bid to just above the bid of the next-ranked bidder, but if bids are tightly clustered, 
low-ranked bidders will want to pay a little more to move up. In a one-shot auction this might 
not be a terrible problem. Indeed, looking at a closely related model, Bulow and Levin (2006) 
show that there is a mixed strategy equilibrium that can be close to efficient. In practice, 
however, the early search auctions had unstable dynamics. Edelman and Ostrovsky (2007) 
document how bidders would gradually outbid each other for the top position until dropping to 
lower bids and re-starting the cycle, creating a lot of needless activity in the market.
13 
  A third and more recent innovation is for search engines to estimate the quality of each ad 
and use the resulting quality scores to weight the bids in the action. In the above model, this has 
the effect of allowing high quality (or more “relevant”) advertisers to obtain higher positions and 
pay less for their positions than they otherwise would (Edelman, Ostrovsky, Schwarz, 2007). 
This sort of differential pricing makes sense if one of the goals of a search engine is to show 
users higher quality ads and improve their overall experience. 
                                                 
12 Milgrom (2009) explains some of the theoretical benefits of this type of simplification. One of his insights is that 
it can eliminate "bad" equilibria. For example, if a search engine ran a separate second price auction for each 
position, there would be equilibria where no advertiser bothered to submit a losing bid, leading to zero revenue, and 
this equilibrium might be the natural outcome to expect with even small bidding costs. 
13 One story I have heard about why search engines switched to the second price format is that the frequent bid 
changes created a burden for their servers. But Matt Jackson has pointed a separate problem that may also have been 
a major concern. Over time, bidders in a repeated pay-your-bid auction may recognize that there is little to gain by 
bidding up the price only to cycle down, leading to prices settling at a low (or seemingly “collusive”) level.  
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Edelman et al. and Varian show that an attractive feature of the GSP auction is that it 
potentially has a stable and efficient outcome with competitive prices. Although bidders do not 
have a dominant strategy (depending on the behavior of other bidders, an advertiser might want 
to bid more or less than its actual value per click), the auction does have pure strategy Nash 
equilibria when bidders have complete information about each others' values, and these 
equilibria match up the competitive outcomes described above.  
To show this, Edelman et al. and Varian focus on a particular subset of Nash equilibria 
with the property that no bidder wants to "trade positions" with the bidder just above or below 
(i.e. assume the competitor's position and pay the price it is currently paying).
14 In such an 
equilibrium, the allocation of bidders to positions is efficient and the payments made by the 
winning bidders coincide with the payments in some competitive equilibrium. Moreover, for any 
competitive equilibrium, there is a refined equilibrium of the GSP auction that also has an 
efficient assignment of advertisers to positions and precisely the same payments. 
  Of course, the search engines could have pursued alternative auction designs, such as a 
Vickrey auction. A Vickrey auction works the same as a GSP auction except that instead of 
paying the next highest bid, each bidder pays an amount equal to the externality it imposes on 
lower-ranked bidders by displacing them one position. Specifically, if we order the bids such that 
b
(1) ≥ .. .≥ b
(n), the payment for position n is  ( ) ∑ + ≥ − − =
1 n k k k
(k)
n x x b     t 1 . This payment rule makes 
it a dominant strategy to bid one's true valuation, and hence the equilibrium payments in the 
                                                 
14 Edelman et al. refer to these equilibria as "locally envy free", while Varian calls them "symmetric". To see how 
the equilibria work, suppose that b
(1) ≥...≥b
(n) is a bid vector and v
(k) is the valuation of the kth highest bidder. The 













(k))xk-1. But this means 
that the conditions for a refined equilibrium are identical to the conditions for a competitive equilibrium with per-
click prices pk = b




Vickrey auction correspond exactly to the lowest market clearing position prices. Vickrey 
pricing is reportedly used by Facebook in their advertising auctions. 
  Recent work on sponsored search auctions also considers a number of extensions that go 
beyond the basic analysis I have described. Chen and He (2006) and Athey and Ellison (2011) 
incorporate consumer choices about which ads to click (see also Gomes, 2009, and Jeziorski and 
Segal, 2009, for some evidence). Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) study the use of optimal reserve 
prices using a large field experiment. And several papers, including Borgers, Cox, Pesendorfer 
and Petricek (2008), Varian (2009) and Athey and Nekipelov (2010), combine versions of the 
model described above with bidding data to estimate bidder valuations and the split of surplus 
between bidders and search engines. 
 
B. Reputation Systems 
My second example of a novel market institution comes from internet commerce. While 
selling online reduces certain frictions, such as search costs, moving toward long distance and 
more anonymous trade can create new problems. In particular, it is hard to examine goods and it 
may be difficult for buyers to know whether they can trust the person with whom they are 
trading. A salient illustration of this comes from a paper by Jin and Kato (2006). They purchased 
baseball cards online and off-line and then had them graded by a professional service. They 
found substantially more misrepresentation in the online transactions.  
One response to this type of problem has been to design mechanisms that elicit and 
aggregate user feedback to help other users assess the quality of sellers or products. A 
prototypical example is eBay’s reputation system. On eBay, buyers and sellers can submit 
feedback after each transaction. In the baseline implementation of the system, users could offer a  
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positive, negative or neutral rating, plus a short message. Many studies, starting with Resnick et 
al. (2001), have argued that the feedback system was crucial to eBay's success, and a substantial 
empirical literature, surveyed by Dellarocas (2006), has found that sellers with higher feedback 
scores enjoy some modest benefits in terms of higher prices and sales rates.  
More recent work by Bolton, Greiner and Ockenfels (2009) also highlights some of the 
pitfalls in developing effective reputation systems. A natural concern is that because providing 
feedback is in some sense a public good, users might not bother to do it. This may be a 
considerable problem in some markets, but it does not appear to be a problem on eBay, where 
about 70% of traders give feedback. Nevertheless, Bolton et al. identify a different problem, 
namely that the feedback system is not necessarily that informative. In fact, over 98% of 
feedbacks are positive --- the system appears to suffer from severe grade inflation. 
One potential reason why buyers might fail to submit informative negative feedback is 
that they fear retaliation. In eBay's baseline system, feedback was posted immediately, and 
sellers who received negative feedback had a strong tendency to respond by giving the buyer a 
reciprocal negative feedback. Bolton et al. report on a series of lab experiments in which 
eliminating sequential feedback and allowing for more fine-grained ratings dramatically 
improved the informativeness of user reports, and improved the efficiency of exchange. Their 
findings were evidently so convincing that eBay remodeled the feedback system to incorporate 
these suggestions. Bolton et al. provide some evidence that the change led to more informative 
feedback, but interestingly the field results do not appear to be as dramatic as the lab results. This 
suggests that perhaps the institution could benefit from further incremental innovations. 
The design of reputation mechanisms is closely related to the problem of designing 
systems to aggregate user reviews or product evaluations. The design and incentives of these  
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systems, and their effects on consumer purchasing patterns, have attracted considerable attention 
in computer science and marketing, but somewhat less in economics. Avery, Resnick and 
Zeckhauser (2001) is one early study of recommender systems that focuses on how to structure 
the timing of evaluations and payments to consumers. Many of the mechanisms currently in use 
on platforms such as Netflix or Amazon or consumer review sites do not use payments, but users 
perhaps enjoy a certain status benefit from posting informative evaluations.  
 
C. Matching and Other Market Design Problems 
Both sponsored search auctions and to some extent the design of recommender systems 
can be seen as particular approaches to the general problem of how to match consumers to 
products or services in online settings where there are potentially a large array of offerings.  
Many online markets face a design problem that is in certain ways quite similar to 
sponsored search, even if the relevant goods are jobs, retail products, collectibles, real estate, 
vacation packages, or potential dating partners. Potential "buyers" input a search query and 
expect to see a ranking of potential "matches". These settings can differ from sponsored search 
along several dimensions: the information about likely matches can reside with buyers, sellers, or 
the platform itself; the verifiable outcomes from a successful search might be more or less 
detailed, allowing for platforms to charge sellers per-transaction or on a commission basis rather 
than for "per-click" or "per-impression"; and the platform may or may not need to worry about 
fostering competition between sellers in addition to directing buyers. 
While there is no “canonical” model that captures all these issues, some recent work 
captures particular aspects of them. One example is models of price competition in which 
consumers search across firms in order of price (Baye and Morgan, 2001) or prominence  
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(Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou, 2009). Hagiu and Julien (2010) flip this problem around and 
look at the search problem from the platform's perspective, pointing out that if additional 
searches lead to more revenue, a platform may not want to guide consumer's immediately to the 
most attractive offering. Their paper relates to the general question of how platforms should try 
to structure ranking mechanisms, while taking into account that the ranking mechanism will 
affect both consumer search patterns and seller incentives.
15 
Another example of a matching problem, and one that is noticeably less structured than 
ordering search results, arises in auction markets for web page advertising. In these markets, 
firms bid to have their ads shown to specific consumers, or on specific web pages. The ability to 
customize advertising down to the individual user and minute creates an interesting tension. On 
the one hand, creating markets where advertisers can demand highly targeted advertising 
placements is potentially efficient. On the other hand, it can allow informed advertisers to 
"cherry-pick" the best opportunities, or can lead to a failure of competition if individual markets 
become too thin (Levin and Milgrom, 2010). Recent papers by Abraham, Athey, Babaioff, and 
Grubb (2011), Bergemann and Bonatti (2010), and McAfee, Papineni, and Vassilvitskii (2010) 
have made progress on modeling these issues.  
Finally, a third set of interesting problems relate to the potential for continuous trading in 
many internet markets. For example, in the internet advertising markets just mentioned, many 
advertisers arrange in advance to have their ads shown for particular blocks of time or to a 
guaranteed number of users. But residual inventory is auctioned in real time. Alternatively, 
electronic financial exchanges allow trading in real time, but certain platforms such as the NYSE 
                                                 
15 The papers by Athey and Ellison (2011) and Gomes (2009) mentioned above are also relevant. One interesting 
question here is the extent to which platforms should be transparent about their ranking methods. Some of the best 
known examples, such as Google’s quality-weighted ad rankings and eBay’s “best match” system for search, are 
relatively opaque, presumably to discourage sellers from trying to manipulate the rankings.  
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operate separate markets for large trades that clear at discrete intervals.
16 The costs and benefits 
or clearing markets in real time, as opposed to at discrete intervals or through pre-arranged 
contracts, have not been that well studied in the literature on market design. 
 
4. Evidence on Competition and Consumer Behavior 
In this section, I turn from what are mainly theoretical analyses of platform competition 
and market mechanisms to discuss the empirical evidence on competition and consumer behavior 
in internet markets. Many of the relevant questions about consumer and firm behavior in this 
context are motivated by the technological shifts highlighted in the introduction. For instance, 
what are the effects of reducing search and distribution costs, or making it easier to customize 
products and information, or of reducing the transaction costs associated with sophisticated 
pricing or sales mechanisms? In addition, the ability to capture and record behavior and 
transactions in great detail makes internet markets a natural environment to test broader theories 
about consumer decision-making and imperfect competition. 
 
A. Search Costs and Price Competition 
One of the prominent hypotheses in the early days of internet commerce was that 
reductions in search costs would intensify competition and reduce price dispersion. This 
hypothesis has generated sustained empirical interest. In one early study, Brynjolfsson and Smith 
(2000) found that online prices for books and CDs were roughly ten percent lower than offline, 
                                                 
16 As a third example, one can ask why in sponsored search each query should trigger a new auction, and why 
bidders are allowed to continuously update their bids. One justification is that the number and type of searches is 
variable, so advertisers attempting to allocate a budget across keywords will want to optimize dynamically, and 
prices should similarly adjust. Another is that bidders are learning about their values or click rates, or about the 
behavior of their competitors. Both stories suggests that bidding is unlikely to be stable as in the static GSP analysis.  
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but featured significant variation across retailers, up to 30% of the average price. Subsequently, 
Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004) found similarly large posted price variation for consumer 
electronics in data obtained from a price search engine. A raft of further studies have reached 
generally the same conclusion: that online competition has lowered prices, but that price 
dispersion remains ubiquitous despite the seemingly low-cost nature of the search environment 
(Ellison and Ellison, 2005).
17  
  One way to rationalize the persistence of price dispersion, even in structured search 
environments, is by arguing that although search costs have decreased, they remain non-trivial. 
In the model of Baye and Morgan (2001), some consumers still fail to compare prices even after 
the arrival of internet price comparisons, and this results in an equilibrium distribution of prices. 
More subtly, Ellison and Ellison (2009) argue that low search costs have encouraged online 
retailers to create new frictions by using "obfuscation" strategies such as up-sells, add-ons and 
bait-and-switches (see also Ellison, 2005). They provide support for this argument by combining 
data price data from a comparison website and sales data from a competing electronics retailer. 
They show that consumer demand on the comparison site is remarkably price-elastic because 
consumers tend to click on the highest-ranked listings. But they also document a range of tactics 
that make the sales process less transparent, so that consumers often don't buy the product that 
prompted the original click. 
Another line of research argues that price dispersion and other aspects of online pricing 
may reflect a lack of consumer sophistication that manifests as “excessive” costs of search. Lee 
and Malmendier (2010) study an episode on eBay in which a particular board game was 
available both at a posted price and by auction. They find that in about a quarter of the auctions, 
                                                 
17 There are some caveats. For instance, Ghose and Yao (2009) point out that most studies of price comparison 
engines look for dispersion in posted prices, rather than in transaction prices. They provide evidence from the 
GAO's procurement marketplace, showing that transaction prices feature much lower dispersion.  
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the game sold for $10 or more above the posted price, and argue that this is hard to reconcile 
with standard models of costly search. The episode is intriguing but it may not be entirely 
representative. Einav, Kuchler, Levin and Sundaresan (2011) look at tens of thousands of more 
recent cases in which an eBay seller offered the same good by auction and posted price. They 
find that auction prices were only rarely as much as $10 above the posted price, and more 
typically were 10-20% lower. 
A potentially more robust pricing anomaly comes from studies looking at the extent to 
which consumers internalize add-on prices such as shipping fees. In a series of studies, Hossain 
and Morgan (2006), Brown, Hossain and Morgan (2009), and Tyan (2005) use field experiment 
and observational data to argue that eBay auction prices do not fully adjust to reflect differences 
in shipping fees. Einav et al. (2011) reach a similar conclusion based on cases where sellers 
auctioned identical items with different shipping fees. They find that for each $1 increase in 
shipping fee, auction prices adjust down by only about $0.40 to $0.80. These findings are 
consistent with the general observation that certain fees and prices can be less salient to 
consumers --- in this case, despite the setting being fairly simple and transparent.  
 
B. The "Long-Tail" Theory of Demand 
Another early and prominent hypothesis about internet commerce was that the 
combination of low search costs and low costs of product proliferation would shift consumer 
demand away from common items toward niche products --- the so-called “long tail” hypothesis 
(Anderson, 2006). In an influential paper, Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2003) estimated that of 
the roughly two million book titles offered by Amazon in 2000, the top 100,000 (roughly the 
number of titles available at a Barnes and Noble superstore) accounted for only about 70% of  
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total sales. Moreover, they estimated that the annual consumer surplus from sales of these niche 
books could be as high as $1 billion.  
Their finding drew attention to the possibility that sales of niche products with low 
volumes could collectively be very important (see also Chevalier and Goolsbee, 2003). In a 
recent follow-up, Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2010) argue that the importance of niche products 
has grown over time. Using 2008 data from Amazon, they estimate that books ranked above 
100,000 now account for over 35% of sales and perhaps $5 billion in consumer surplus.
18 
While the proliferation of products online seems hard to debate, the "long tail" shift that 
Brynjolfsson et al. find is not a completely obvious implication. One reason is that by lowing the 
costs of dissemination and distribution for popular products, the internet allows products that 
attract some enthusiastic consumers or get favorable reviews to expand their market share 
rapidly. Indeed, Elberse and Olberhozer-Gee (2008) provide some evidence from the video rental 
business that online markets have had the reverse effect of channeling demand toward the most 
popular products. This idea is reminiscent of Rosen's (1981) "superstar" theory, where falling 
distribution costs can lead to a more skewed distribution of sale. 
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) provide another relevant piece of evidence by looking at 
the individual consumption of online media. They show that people who seek out "niche" media 
online (they define "niche" in terms of ideological slant rather than market share), also visit the 
most common mainstream media sites. Their findings suggest that to the extent that the internet 
has allowed niche or "tail" products to succeed, substitution toward these products may occur 
within as opposed to across consumers. Given the wealth of data available about online 
                                                 
18 The new paper uses a different specification to estimate the shape of the sales distribution, and the authors suggest 
their model used in earlier paper might have overstated the importance of niche products.  
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purchasing and browsing decisions, this debate about shifts in product market concentration 
seems ripe for further analysis. 
 
C. Auctions and Dynamic Sales Mechanisms 
A third prominent hypothesis dating to the early days of online markets was that because 
of reduced transaction costs, online markets would shift away from traditional posted prices 
toward more flexible and dynamic sales mechanisms (e.g. Lucking-Reiley, 2000; Hall, 2002). 
An obvious example of this are the consumer auctions conducted on eBay and other platforms 
(Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003). In general, auctions tend to involve higher transaction costs than 
posted prices because the seller has to assemble competing buyers. In online markets the 
transaction cost is reduced because bids can be submitted remotely, and in some cases using 
computer "proxies". If the cost becomes manageable, auctions have the desirable property that 
they facilitate price discovery and encourage buyer competition for scarce goods. 
On eBay, for example, this general story appears to be about right. Looking across the 
platform, it appears that auctions are used to sell idiosyncratic items and by occasional sellers 
who might be less well informed about demand or more eager to sell. Einav, Farronato, Levin 
and Sundaresan (2011), however, point out that over time the fraction of listings that are posted 
price has increased dramatically, from less than 10% to over 90%. There are several possible 
explanations, but one is that over time, the internet has not just reduced the transaction cost of 
running auctions, it has reduced the cost of finding prices for comparable goods, so that there is 
less need to use an auction to discover the appropriate market price. 
Even when posted prices are generally efficient, there are certain types of perishable 
goods for which auction markets can play a key role in allocating “last-minute” inventory.  
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Online examples include plane and hotel reservations, and web page advertising. Another 
example, studied by Sweeting (2010), online ticket sales. He also finds that prices adjust 
downward as events approach, and relates this to the predictions of dynamic pricing models, 
where the opportunity cost of selling falls as the "expiration date" approaches. Of course, the 
equilibrium price path can depend on whether buyers anticipate price declines and time their 
purchases strategically. Board and Skrzypacz (2010) show in the presence of strategic buyers, 
the optimal sales strategy for a perishable goods seller typically involve dynamic price 
adjustment followed by a last-minute auction if there is remaining inventory. 
 
5. Directions for Future Research 
Over the last fifteen years, there has been a remarkable shift of economic and social 
activity onto the internet. In this paper, I have described one slice of the economic research this 
shift has inspired, research on the development of internet platforms and new online 
marketplaces. Because this work is still at a fairly early stage, I want to conclude by highlighting 
a few directions for future progress that seem particularly promising. 
At the outset, I argued a defining feature of many internet markets is innovation, and 
particularly incremental innovation that occurs continuously, often accompanied and guided by 
systematic experimentation. But you'll notice that this aspect of internet markets hasn't been a 
major focus of the research I've discussed. This is surprising for several reasons. First, to the 
extent that continuous improvement is a key feature of internet platforms, one wants to account 
for it in thinking about platform competition or internet market design. For instance, I mentioned 
earlier that one form of scale economy for internet platforms might be access to more and better 
data that allows for faster learning and broader experimentation. Alternatively, one might argue  
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that well-designed market mechanisms are those that leave room for improvements as better data 
becomes available, just as the sponsored search auctions I described earlier current estimates of 
the relevance and quality of each ad. 
The potential for experimentation in online markets is also useful as an empirical tool. 
There is already a significant amount of work, dating back at least to Lucking-Reiley (1999), that 
uses online field experiments to answer questions about pricing decisions, advertising 
responsiveness, and other aspects of internet markets (Lewis and Reiley, 2010, and Ostrovsky 
and Schwarz, 2010 are two recent and large-scale examples). Einav, Kuchler, Levin and 
Sundaresan (2011) point out that researchers also can make use of "experiments" conducted by 
market participants. They identify hundreds of thousands of cases where eBay sellers varied 
pricing or listing parameters for fixed items and use this targeted variation to study consumer 
behavior and market outcomes. 
A related and final point pertains to empirical research more generally, or at least 
empirical research on competition and consumer behavior. Over the last twenty-five years or so, 
a major emphasis of empirical research on industry competition has been on developing and 
applying econometric methods that were designed at least in part to substitute or compensate for 
lack of data --- for example, methods for estimating consumer preferences from aggregate 
demand data, or methods or for using equilibrium assumptions to infer cost parameters or 
demand elasticities that are difficult to measure directly or experimentally (Einav and Levin, 
2010). 
In internet markets, the situation can be quite different – there is a tremendous ability to 
measure behavior at a individual level (perhaps down to the individual "click") and in many 
cases the opportunity to find or create useful variation in prices or other parameters to measure  
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relevant behavioral elasticities. Instead the challenge seems to be to find meaningful ways to 
extract useful information from such rich data, or statistics that are both precise and revealing. In 
this sense, moving from problems of too little data and a focus on econometric methods designed 
as a substitute, to environments with enormous amounts of data, and many possibilities for 
experiments to learn about causal effects is going to require a real shift in mind-set, new thinking 
and new approaches. This is a promising topic for future research.  
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